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Among Asia's developing economies, the Republic of Korea
(ROK) had a remarkable export performance in 1986. Its current
account swung from a deficit of US$890 million in 1985 to a surplus
of US$4.65 billion in 1986. This phenomenal trade surplus,
together with the on-going implementation of financial reform, has
triggered off grave concerns amongst the foreign banks in the ROK,
which have traditionally assumed a catalytic role to Korean
economic development and have become accustomed to enjoying high
profits in their operations.
Apart from giving readers a clear picture of the current
financial system of the ROK, this study also analyses the foreign
banks' operations in the country and describes the opportunities
and threats the banks will be facing in the coming years. The
research is based on the findings from our questionnaire survey and
interviews with bankers in Hong Kong.
Our research reveals that most foreign bankers have started
to re-orientate their operations so as to fit in with their own
strengths and to weather the mounting competition. In preparing
for the future, we would recommend that the foreign banks engage in
several areas such as leasing and advisory services that have great
potential for growth in the years ahead.
In short, the Korean market still looks attractive to
foreign banks as a strategic location in the Asian-Pacific region.
Yet, the banks' profit margins are likely to become under great
pressure during the coming years. Finally, we hope this study will
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The Republic of Korea (ROK), the largest debtor country in
the Asian Pacific countries, lately has been achieving a very
satisfactory improvement in its foreign exchange balance. The
country registered a first-ever trade surplus of US$751 million for
1986's first eight months, in contrast to a year earlier deficit of
1
about US$1 billion as stated in the Asian Wall Street Journal.
Inter alia, the success is attributed partly by the foreign banks
operating in ROK.
Foreign banks have made a significant contribution to the
development of the Korean economy, mainly by providing capital to
compensate for the shortage of domestic savings, thereby providing
funds for investment and filling the gap in the balance of payments
position, especially after the two oil price rises of the 1970s.
Since the late 1970s, foreign banks have been acting as crucial
intermediaries in introducing long-term and short-term funds for
domestic banks. Besides, foreign banks have assisted the
modernization of the Korean financial market by the example of
their advanced management skills, which have helped to develop the
domestic banks' competitiveness. Equally important has been the




indirect contribution made by the foreign banks in the help given
to Korean organizations importing foreign resources.
Up to now, the performance of foreign banks in ROK has been
successful in terms of achieving a high level of profits as
compared with that of the local banks. For instance, the ratio of
return to total assets (RTA) of the foreign banks' branches in ROK
was 1.5 percent, which compares very favourably with the 0.3
percent for the five major Korean commercial banks. 1 This may
be the outcome of several interconnecting factors including
ownership advantages, supply side imperfection, and deliberate
government policies to grant special privileges to attract foreign
banks.
Despite what may be considered a successful performance of
foreign banks in the ROK, the recent financial reform measures are
likely to affect the future profitability of foreign banks. The
objectives of the policy are to increase competition in the
domestic financial market and to prepare for full
internationalization of the Korean financial sector. The
liberalization process is a mixed blessing for foreign banks. On
one hand, the liberalization process has granted foreign banks the
right to diversify their funding sources as well as their services
offered, but on the other hand, it will abolish some of the
privileges previously granted to foreign banks and impose
additional constraints on their operations in order to put them on
an equal footing with local banks.
Earlier 1986, the Morgan Guarantee Trust's closing down of
"Foreign Banking in South Korea", an article written by Dr.
1. HO Yan-ki, The Chinese University of Hong Kong,1985.
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its Seoul branch shocked foreign bankers. Is it the signal that
foreign banks are beginning to feel the pinch from such changes?
Are they starting to worry about the future profitability of
investments in the nation? In this regard, we deem an updated
study on the opportunities and threats towards the foreign banking
business in the ROK will be very useful to bankers who have already
had presence in the ROK or who are prepared to invest in the
financial industry in the country.
4CHAPTER II
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES & METHODOLOGY
Research Objectives
The ROK has been an exceptionally rewarding market for
foreign banks in terms of their high profitability recorded in the
past few years. As the domestic financial institutions become more
efficient and the balance of payments position improves, together
with the reshuffling of the roles brought along by the recent
financial reform program, it will be of great interest to see
whether the foreign banks can still maintain high profits in the
years ahead, and whether the importance of foreign banks as
providers of foreign exchange will decline.
In addition, the three lows-- low oil price, low interest
rate and low Korean currency (Won) began to work favourably on the
Korean economy from early 1986. The phenomenon of its first trade
surplus poses the question of whether the economy's surge can be
sustained. If the Korean economy continues to boom in the
forthcoming years, we will not be surprised to see a changed role
of South Korea from a borrower to a lender in the international
money market. Hence, our study hopes to stimulate people's
interest in the South Korean market which is increasing in
importance in the Asian-Pacific region. Our study also attempts to
identify opportunities for foreign investors in the ROK.
5
To this end, we have formulated the statement of problem as
well as our three-fold research objectives as follows:
1. Statement of Problem
Are there still opportunities for foreign banks
operating in the ROK? Can the banks still enjoy high
profitability as in past years?
2. Research Objectives
Our research objectives are threefolds:
a. to examine the current financial situation of the ROK
b. to study the operations of foreign banks in the ROK
financial system and
c. to analyse and identify the threats and opportunities
faced by foreign banks in the country.
Research Methodology
In order to study the historical and present situation of
the Korean financial system, we relied largely on literature
research books, periodicals and newspaper clippings are the main
sources. For the part regarding opportunities open to foreign
banks, we carried out personal interviews with bankers in Hong Kong
and mailed a questionnaire survey. Because of the time constraint,
we only carried out four interviews which were conducted with
semi-structured questions (see Appendix 1).
Apart from this, we also visited the Bank of Korea (the
central bank of the ROK) and the Korea Exchange Bank in Hong Kong,
which have provided us with a good knowledge on the Korean economy
and valuable insights on the foreign banks' roles in the financial
system.
6
Two sets of questionnaires were also prepared for
approaching the foreign banks. The first set was mailed to all
foreign banks registered and operating in the ROK. This set had
the objectives of soliciting information on their present
activities, their reasons for operating in the ROK, their attitudes
towards government policies and the opportunities and threats they
are facing in the forthcoming years. The questionnaire developed
was basically qualitative-oriented and utilized largely the
attitude scaling techniques like the Likert Scale and Semantic
Differential (The questionnaire is listed in Appendix 2). We sent
out questionnaires to all foreign banks in the ROK (The whole
1
population is 59) at the beginning of November.
The second set was sent to foreign banks in Hong Kong that
have no presence in the ROK. The objective was to see why these
banks had not established a foothold in the country and how they
view the Korean financial market. This is taken as a control to
the questionnaire survey on the foreign banks in the ROK. The
questionnaire design largely follows the first set of
questionnaires (See Appendix 3). As we cannot cover the entire
population, we have used the random sampling method to select 50
banks of this category and we mailed out the questionnaire in
2
mid-November.
The mailing addresses of the 59 foreign banks is quoted trom
1. The Banker's Handbook, published by the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, July 1986.
The 50 foreign banks are selected randomly from The Banker's





The introduction of a modern banking system into the ROK
dates back to 1878. The first bank established in the nation was
the First National Bank by the Japanese. However, the banking
system development was disrupted by the liberation movements in
1945 and in 1950. A new central bank, the Bank of Korea, was
established to restructure the banking system under the new
political environment. But in the late 1950s, the country was
again thrown into chaos by the military revolution.
Consequently, in 1961 (the first year under President Park
Chung Hee's reign), the government took up a major portion of the
equity of commercial banks as a means to influence the monetary
system. President Park's government also introduced various
specialized banks to facilitate financial support for
under-developed or strategically important sectors, and encouraged
foreign investment. The entrance of foreign banks into the nation
would be a good illustration.
At that time, the Korean economy was small in scale and
simple in structure thus it could still be controlled by the
government. Since then, the Korean government has transformed the
country from a marginally subsistent agricultural economy into one
of Asia's major industrial nations. By 1985, real GNP, growing at
8an average rate of 7.7 percent per annum since 1970, has risen from
US$7.9 billion to US$83.1 billion based on current prices, while
per capita GNP, in current prices, has increased from US$248 to
US$2,032. The economy has actually attained a remarkable growth as
one compares the major economic indicators between 1970 and 1985
(Table 1). Indeed, the ROK has outperformed most Asian economies
in annual growth rate in GDP for the past decade 1976-86. 1 As
the economy grew much larger and more complex, it reached the stage
where entrusting the management of the economy to the government's
initiative became inefficient. Therefore, a government-oriented
management of the economy should be turned into a market-oriented
one. Wide-ranging structural adjustment policies such as
decentralization were hence implemented since the 1980s. These
policies were aimed at enhancing economic efficiency by assigning a
greater degree of reliance to the market mechanism and promoting
competition in every sector of the economy. In line with this,
various measures for liberalization and the promotion of
competition in the financial sector have been taken.
Nowadays, the government still exercises significant
controls over the banking system in various ways. For example, its
control over resource allocation has been conducted through
guidelines under the Regulation on the Uses of Funds in the
Financial System passed by the Monetary Board in December 1958 and
amended from time to time. Specific directives are given to the
banks regarding the allocation of funds to industrial sectors, and
the composition of loan portfolios. Moreover, in order to reduce
"Challenges Ahead for Asia's Economies", The Asian Wall
1. Street Journal, August 29, 1986.
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the interest cost of firms and make the export sector more
competitive, the government advocates a low-interest rate policy
which has sometimes resulted in negative interest rates in
rea l terms due to the higher rate of inflation. With the objective
of increasing the extent of autonomy in the operations of the
financial industry, the government started the liberalization
program in 1984.
Financial Market Reform Programme
In 1984, the government initiated a reform programme to
re-frame the outmoded structure of the domestic financial system by
emphasizing the free-market mechanism, sophistication,
specialization and internationalization by charting a fresh
direction into the Korean financial market. The government
intended to re-activate the function of various financial
institutions as a solid pillar of the economy, to readjust the
business areas amongst various financial institutions and to lift
the foreign exchange regulations to be in line with the economy's
development. Whether the ROK should adopt either the universal
banking system or the specialized banking system is one
highlight of the reform programme. However, the conflicts of
interest amongst financial institutions is delaying the smooth
1
implementation of the reform programme.
In late 1985, the government arrived at the basic reform
directions which include:
1. pursuing a "specialized banking system", thus enabling
"Korea Pushing Financial Market Reform Program", The Korea
1.
Times, May 16, 1986.
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each market participant to handle its own intrinsic
business;
2 authorization of weaker market participants such as
banks to handle ancillary business including leasing, so
as to strike a balance on the profitability level
amongst different players;
3, the need for banks to be at the center stage in the
domestic financial system, and for short-term finance
companies to adopt the niche strategy (i.e. handling
what the banks do not deal with);
the belief that securities firms should act as long-term4,
capital suppliers for the domestic economy and
the belief that merchant banks should become long-term5
foreign currency suppliers to the nation.
In line with the government's implementation of the reform
programme, it is understandable that the market participants will
be trying their best to defend their own business turf and, on the
other hand, seeking to expand their new business boundaries. For
instance, securities companies and leasing firms strongly object to
the entry of the commercial banks into their own business area
through mergers of the ailing securities firms or the setting up of
leasing units while insurance companies are being challenged by
fresh foreign competition as securities houses and investment trust
companies are competing to handle investment advisory services.
Owing to the vested conflicts of interest amongst financial
institutions, an idealistic market reform programme will be
difficult to implement. The compromise agreement from various
parties is expected to be a long-time process.
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Various Groups of Financial Institutions
Various financial institutions in South Korea shoulder
different roles in the financial industry, which can best be
streamed into the following four categories. A whole picture of
the financial system is also shown in Appendix 4.
Among the four groups, banks moved back to the center stage
of the Korean financial market with their combined market share (on
deposits) expanding to 31.1 percent in 1985 from 19.4 percent in
1984. While the market share of non-bank institutions, in terms of
fund raising, decreased to 27.5 percent from 36.1 percent in 1984.
According to the Bank of Korea, the sharp reduction of the market
share of the non-banking institutions was attributed to government
efforts to reduce the interest gap between the banks and the
1
non-bank groups in recent years.
Over the past decade, the non-banking groups have made
active inroads into the domestic financial market because they were
guaranteed higher interest rates, freedom from entry barriers and
less regulation. On the other hand, banks have seen their market
being eroded by the non-banking groups as they were under heavy
influence of government intervention. To have a better picture, we
would describe the financial market make-up of the nation as
follow:
"Banks' Share Rises to 31.1 Pct of Domestic Financial
1. Market", The Korea Times, April 12, 1986.
12
The Central Bank
The central bank in the nation is the Bank of Korea. It was
established in June 1950 under the Bank of Korea Act, with its
principal roles to maintain the stability of the value of money in
the interests of national economic progress and to further the
efficient utilization of national resources through the Korean
Banking System. To this end, the Bank performs the central bank
functions: it serves as the issuer of bank notes and coins the
authority to approve bank licence the banker to the government
the controller of money supply the supervisor of banking
operations, etc.
Banking Institutions (Deposit Money Banks)
There are two major types of financial institutions which
belong to the group of deposit money banks, namely the commercial
banks and the specialized banks:
Commercial Banks
Commercial banks have been playing a leading role in the
nation's financial market. There are seven nationwide commercial
banks, ten local banks and fifty-nine foreign bank branches falling
into this sub-category as of April 1986.
Nationwide Commercial Banks (City Banks)
Amongst the seven nationwide commercial banks, five of them
are directly or indirectly owned by the government while the
13
remaining two are joint ventures owned by the Koreans and
foreigners. These city banks act as the bridge in channelling the
country's savings into investments and loans. They are also the
major vehicles through which the nation can obtain short term
external borrowings.
Nevertheless, the city banks today face structural problems
which primarily relate to the rapid growth and the highly regulated
nature of their activity, which has not given the required impulse
for them to operate as independent profit oriented organizations.
Recently they have also suffered from declining profitability due
to the squeeze in interest margins and also the huge amounts of
irrevocable bad loans. 1
Local Banks
With an aim to achieve inter-regionally balanced development
of the banking industry and to expedite provincial economic
development, ten regional banks were established during 1967 and
1971 in the ten regions of Korea. These local banks are basically
commercial in nature and are held either by large business
conglomerates or by the public. Although the government does not
have a direct ownership, it can exert substantial influence through
the Monetary Board and the Superintendent of Banks.
The ten local banks are confined to operating their branch
banking business within their own regions with the exception of a
Seoul branch. Moreover, they must allocate 55% of their loan
portfolios to small- and medium-sized companies.





The functions of this sub-category will be discussed in
detail in Chapter IV.
Specialized Banks
Functioning as deposit money banks along with the commercial
banks, the seven specialized banks were each established for a
specific purpose in association with the national economic
policies. The major function of these banks is the effective
allocation of funds to specific priority industries or specific
business segments, thereby preparing an industrial and functional
base for the country's development.
As each bank has its own business segment to promote and
foster on behalf of the government, it is more appropriate to
describe them as being of a public institutional nature rather than
as a profit-oriented one. Profitability is not at all their
primary concern as net losses are to be replenished through their
legal reserve. In cases where the reserve is insufficient, the
shortfall will be replenished by the Bank of Korea or the
government.
Non-Bank Financial Institutions
There are many non-bank financial intermediaries, most of
which were introduced in the 1970s. They have recorded significant
increases in number and in the volume of funds handled in the
course of the rapid economic take-off. In 1985, the securities
investment trust companies (a member of the non-bank financial
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institutions) emerged as the most profitable and efficient
institutions in the Korean financial market, while the investment
finance companies as well as securities companies also enjoyed
relatively high yields as compared with the five commercial banks
(See Table 2). 1
Four types of financial institutions can be classified under
this category, namely the development institutions, the savings
institutions, the investment companies and the insurance companies.
Development Institutions
The Korea Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of Korea
and the Korea Long Term Credit Bank fall under this sub-category.
Basically, development institutions resemble very much the seven
specialized banks. Each of them is established for a specific
purpose which associates with the national economic policies.
The Korea Development Bank was founded in 1954 with an
important task to supply long-term credit for major industries.
The Korea Long Term Credit Bank was established in 1967 to extend
long-term credit to business enterprises in the form of loans,
discounts, equity investments and guarantees. The Bank also offers
shorter term credit within the limit of deposits received and
underwrites corporation bonds and stocks issued by private
enterprises. In 1969, the Export-Import Bank of Korea was
established in order to facilitate trade and external cooperation
by providing medium and long-term credit.
"Securities Investment Trust Companies Emerge as Most
1. Profitable in '85", The Korea Times, July 2, 1986.
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Savings Institutions
Trust Accounts of Banking Institutions
The trust business was originally handled by the five
nationwide commercial banks (as another two have not been
established yet) and one local bank. In 1970 it was assigned
exclusively to the Korea Trust Bank. As a measure to diversify the
business of banks, the local banks and the nationwide commercial
banks were allowed to engage in the trust business. Consequently,
as of June 1985, the number of banks which handled trust business
increased to 18 including seven nationwide commercial banks, ten
local banks and the Korea Exchange Bank.
Although the trust business in the ROK has shown a dramatic
increase in total assets as well as profitability levels in recent
years, there are many factors constraining its sound development in
the future. 1
Mutual Savings and Finance Companies
The main business of these companies consists of mutual
installment savings with remuneration, mutual credit Key (a
traditional type of savings and loan association with fixed numbers
and an order of cash receipt set by lottery), and small loans on
credit and discounts of bills for holders of mutual installment
savings. The interest rates on various types of loan and saving
schemes of the companies is determined within a maximum rate set by
the Ministry of Finance, which in general are considerably higher
"Trust Business in Korea", pp.3-16, Monthly Review, Korea
1.
Exchange Bank, July 1986.
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than the rates of the banks. As a result of the lowering of entry
requirements, the number of these companies stood at 240 while the
number of their branch offices amounted to 92 as of June 1985.
Credit Unions Mutual Credit
Since 1960, many credit unions have been organized as
cooperative associations in offices, churches and other private
groups in order to facilitate financing for their members and to
promote mutual economic benefits. The setting up and running of
these unions were not originally subject to administrative guidance
and supervision until the enactment of the Credit Union Act in
1972.
As of June 1985, there are 1,627 mutual credit and 5,512
credit unions in the country. The business of these credit unions
and mutual credit unions are basically the same as banks except
that they may receive deposits from and extend loans to members of
each institution and that income tax, residence tax and education
surtax are exempted for the interest income accruing from deposits
of 5 million Won or less. In addition, the interest rates on
various types of loan and saving schemes of the companies is
determined within a maximum rate set by the Minister of Finance,
which in general are a bit higher than the rates of the banks.
Postal Savings of Post Offices
Like banking institutional deposits, postal savings are
classified into demand deposits and time and savings deposits.
However, postal savings are free from reserve requirements because
the aim of the postal savings business lies in promoting public
18
good rather than making profits. The terms and conditions of postal
savings including interest rates are determined by the Ministry of
Communication after consulting the Ministry of Finance. Postal
savings are treated preferentially in terms of interest rates,
which are usually higher than the rates of the banks.
Investment Companies
Investment and Finance Companies
Investment and finance companies were first established in
1972 with the promulgation of the Short-term Financing Business
Act, with the major functions to develop money markets and attract
funds from the curb market. Their principal business consists of
short-term financing, underwriting, buying and selling of
securities, and they act as brokers or agencies in the sale and
purchase of securities. In an effort to widen their business span
and to enhance their intermediating role, these companies were
allowed to deal in commercial paper with maturities between three
and six months, which is issued and sold in large denominations and
at higher interest rates than other papers. Interest rates of
these companies are to be market-determined but should be below the
maximum rates announced by the Ministry of Finance.
Merchant Banking Corporations
Merchant banking corporations were first established in 1976
under the Merchant Banking Act to meet the demand of enterprises
for a wide range of banking and financial services. Their
principal business areas include: 1. brokerage of foreign capital
on their own account to lend to enterprises; 2. lending of working
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capital and equipment funds; 3. discounts, purchases and sales, and
acceptances and guarantees of paper issued by enterprises; 4.
underwriting and brokerage of securities; and 5. consulting
services, including business management guidance. In addition,
they are authorized to conduct the securities investment trust and
leasing businesses.
In 1983 and 1984, merchant banking corporations achieved the
top positions in profitability, with the ROI ratios (after-tax
profit to the net worth ratios) at 20.2% and 23.6% respectively.
Despite the fact that the "most profitable" position was taken by
securities investment trust companies in 1985, merchant banks still
maintained a high ROI of 18.6% in that year. 1
Life Insurance Companies
The present insurance system is divided into life and non-life
insurance. No insurance company may handle both at the same time.
The life insurance business is at present dominated by six life
insurance companies and the post offices. The premium rates of the
life insurance companies are directly controlled by the Ministry of
Finance. However, the premium rates of post offices are determined
by the Ministry of Communication after consultations with the
Ministry of Finance.
"Securities Investment Trust Companies Emerge as Most
1. Profitable in '85", The Korea Times, July 2, 1986.
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Securities Market
The Securities and Exchange Commission and its executive
body, the Securities Supervisory Board, were established in 1977 in
order to review and decide on matters relating to the issuance of
securities, and to supervise securities companies and other
securities institutions. Under this are the four types of
securities institutions that make up the securities market:
The Korea Stock Exchange
The Korea Stock Exchange was established in 1956 as a joint
stock corporation to provide a public marketplace where the general
public could buy and sell securities. In 1963, it was changed to a
government-controlled juridical body under the Securities and
Exchange Law. At present, 65% of its paid-in capital is owned by
the government while the remaining is owned by twenty-five member
securities companies.
Securities Companies
The securities companies are joint stock corporations which
have obtained business licenses from the Minister of Finance.
According to the Securities and Exchange Law, they carry on the
business involving the following: 1. buying and selling securities
for their own accounts or on consignment; 2. buying and selling
securities as brokers, intermediaries or agents; 3. underwriting
securities as members of the underwriting syndicate; and 4. making
arrangement for the public offering securities. There were
twenty-five securities companies in the country as of June 1985.
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The Korea Securities Finance Corporation
Established in 1955, the Korea Securities Finance
Corporation is a unique institution specializing in securities
financing. The gradual increase in margin transactions has made
its role important in the securities market. Its major activities
are: to make loans to underwriters, to lend money or securities to
securities companies and individuals, to conduct bond trading on
repurchase agreements and to act as securities custodian. In
addition, it is permitted to raise short-term funds by issuing
commercial paper.
Securities Investment Trust Companies
The securities investment trust business was introduced in
1970. At present there are three companies specializing in this
business, namely the Korea Investment Trust Corporation, the Daehan
Investment Trust Corporation and the Citizens Investment Trust
Corporation. In addition to these, the six merchant banks are
authorized to handle this business. As managing companies, they
collect funds through the sale of beneficiary certificates to
investors and transfer the funds to a securities investment trust
account established in the Bank of Seoul and Trust Company.
In 1985, securities investment trust companies emerged as
the most profitable and efficient institutions in the Korean
financial market, beating the merchant banks, which had maintained
1
the top positions in profitability in the past years.
"Securities Investment Trust Companies Emerge as Most




FOREIGN BANKS IN THE ROK
Background
The ROK was especially hard hit by the 1973 and 1977 oil
crises with a rapidly deteriorating current account balances. Like
other oil importing developing countries, the ROK has become
increasingly dependent on commercial bank borrowings to finance her
deficits, and foreign banks have become an important conduit
through which foreign funds are channelled to the ROK.
The history of the foreign banks in the ROK depicts their
development in a series of bursts of activity. Four major US and
Japanese banks arrived during 1967, directly after the Chase
Manhattan Bank first set up its Seoul office in 1967. The next
major phase fell within 1977-8 which recorded an influx of 19
international banks. As of April 1986, there are 59 foreign banks
in the ROK (with 64 branches). Western country banks and Japanese
banks are the dominant elements, with 18 US, 14 Japanese, 6 French
and 5 British banks (for details see Table 3). Most of them are
actually among the world 50 largest banks.
Restrictions and Privileges of the Foreign Banks
The Ministry of Finance of the ROK have the following
objectives in adopting a policy which has permitted the entry of
foreign banks to the Korean domestic banking scene. These are
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specifically: 1
1. to promote foreign capital inducement for economic
development,
2. to diversify the sources of foreign capital,
3. to improve competitiveness through the
internationalization of the domestic banking system and
financial markets,
4. to accelerate foreign investment through providing
adequate support for foreign companies operating in the
ROK,
5. to provide support for the international trade and
investment of domestic enterprises,
6. to reciprocate other countries' acceptance of Korean
bank branches,
7. to encourage transfer of management knowhow from
international banks to domestic banks, and
8. to avoid excessive competition with domestic banks in
fields where this is not necessary to general economic
welfare.
Since the Korean Government opened the Korean market to
foreign banks, it has separated the rules governing domestic and
foreign banks, mainly because of the state of underdevelopment of
the banking industry, and because of the importance of the role
played by the foreign banks. Foreign banks, however, have not
enjoyed total freedom in all areas of banking activities. They are
deprived of certain privileges which are given to the domestic
The Korean Economy, Review and Prospects (5th edition),
1.
Korean Exchange Bank, 1983, p.108.
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banks. While on the other hand, they are free of many of the
restrictions placed on their domestic counterparts concerning
selective credit and liquidity control policies.
Restrictions
The following are the major administrative controls which
apply to foreign banks' establishment and operation:
On Establishment
The establishment of a foreign bank branch in the ROK
requires the approval of the Monetary Board, as recommended by the
Superintendent of Banks under the provisions of the General Banking
Act. The same procedure is applied when a foreign bank which is
already established in the ROK plans to change the location of its
branch or the scope of its business activities.
Permission to open a branch by foreign banks is granted
selectively in view of reciprocity and the bank branch's potential
contribution to the Korean economy. In addition, foreign banks are
prohibited from opening more than two branches in the nation and
from opening more than one branch within a single city. In this
regard, foreign banks are restricted to operate in the capital city
Seoul and the major city Pusan, but are not allowed in the other
parts of the nation.
On Operating Funds
Foreign banks' operating funds are classified into two
categories: Fund A and Fund B. Fund A is the paid-in capital of
the foreign banks while Fund B is the amount of funds obtained
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through swap transactions. Currently, a foreign bank must have a
Fund A of 3 billion Won or more to obtain an approval to open a
branch; whereas for Fund B, it cannot exceed 600% of the aggregate
amount of Fund A reserves together with the retained earnings.
On Profit Remittances
All foreign banks must obtain permission from the Bank of
Korea regarding their appropriation of profits, remittances to
parent companies, payments of tax or for any purpose other than the
depositing of legal reserves.
On Book Closing
In cases where any branch of a foreign bank has incurred a
book loss, it must replenish the loss either by receiving foreign
currency funds from its headoffice within 60 days from the date of
book closing, or from unappropriated retained earnings carried over
from the preceding financial period.
Privileges
Foreign banks are granted a number of privileges as a means
to attract the inflow of foreign funds. The most important of
these are as follows:
On Currency Arrangements
Foreign banks can convert their foreign currency into Won
through a repurchase agreement with the Bank of Korea. Under this
agreement, the swap transactions are unaffected by exchange rate
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fluctuations. Currently a 0.75% margin on 'swap fund'- the
foreign currency fund brought in by foreign banks from their
headoffices for conversion into Won-- is guaranteed. As of
September, 1986, total swap fund is scaled at US$1.9 billion. 1
Besides, they are allowed to hold generous over-bought
positions under the present foreign exchange regulations, which
enables them to hedge against exchange rate from fluctuations.
On Loans
Foreign banks are less restricted by the preferential policy
loan obligations. At present, they are supposed to allocate only
25% of funds for loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises,
whereas the domestic banks are required to give at least 35% of
their annual incremental loans to such firms.
Moreover, they can receive compensating balances in their
loan agreements. When received in the form of demand deposits, the
compensating balance requirement raises substantially the effective
lending rate. Local banks, however, have been banned from this
form of transaction.
The basic ceilings on bank loans and guarantees for a single
borrower are set at 25% and 50% respectively of the domestic bank's
equity capital. This regulation is not applied so strictly to the
foreign banks' borrowers.
Besides, foreign banks can avoid default risk and save the
lending costs by securing guarantees from the borrowers' principal
Korean banks as a prior condition of their loans.
"Monetary Moratorium", Far Eastern Economic Review,
1.
September 4, 1986, p.34.
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On Tax
Foreign banks are exempted from corporate tax on interest
and commission income earned from foreign currency loans. They are
also not obliged to subscribe to the Monetary Stabilization Bonds,
or to assist in the regulation of liquidity by depositing funds in
the Monetary Stabilization Account of the Bank of Korea.
To sum up, the privileges accorded to foreign banks appear
to outweigh the restrictions imposed on them, which put them in a
favourable operating environment. The following section, however,
highlights the features of the foreign banks' operations in the ROK
by focusing on their sources and uses of fund, and their overall
profitability.
Features of the Foreign Banks' Operations
Sources of Funds
Foreign banks' funds in the ROK come from three sources:
paid-in capital, deposits and inter-office borrowings (IOB). In
contrast with the domestic banks, borrowing from headoffices or
from other branches in other countries have been the most dominant
sources of funds. In 1975, IOB accounted for 48.9% of supplies but
started to rise to more than 70% in the late 1970s. The feature
remains valid in the 1980s (see Table 4). The IOB for the first
eight months in 1986 has accumulated to 4,824.6 billion Won. Local
currency and foreign currency deposits accounted for only 13.1% of
fund sources at the end of 1984. This special funding feature is
due to the high profitability of swap transactions which are used
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to convert these borrowings into local currency, and the fact that
local interest rates have in general been higher than those in the
international markets, allowing IOB to be raised more cheaply than
funds in local markets.
From Table 4, the share of local currency deposits in total
funds, however, dwindled from 8.2% in 1979 to 7.7% in 1984. It is
largely the result of the fact that foreign banks can have at most
two branches in the nation, which greatly handicaps foreign banks
in collecting local currency deposits as compared with local banks
that have a nation-wide branch network. Besides, the demand
deposits in local currency registered a significant increase in
1985 over 1983, from 98 billion Won to 290.2 billion Won. This is
probably the result of the compensating balance requirement applied
to loans made by the foreign banks' branches.
Uses of Funds
In 1984, local currency loans and advances took up 33.6% of
assets (the percentage remained around 33.8% in 1985) and foreign
currency loans accounted for 38.1% of assets (37.3% in 1985). The
percentage of foreign currency loans to total assets has, however,
contracted constantly since 1979 (57.9% of total assets), probably
as a result of the higher price of offshore funds and the falling
demand of Korean and foreign companies for such loans. Conversely,
the percentage of local currency loans as a proportion of total
assets has increased from 25.3% in 1979 to 33.8% in 1985, because
of the expansion of the swap facility in 1980 and 1982, and the
allowances made in 1981 and 1983 for a wider application of local
currency supplied under the swap agreement.
In general, foreign banks use their funds largely to provide
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loans and discounts. This is in contrast to domestic banks which
tend to have a more diversified use of their funds. Apart from
loans and discounts, foreign banks also allocate their funds to
other uses such as deposits with the Bank of Korea, call loans, and
investments in securities. Securities and call loans to Korean
banks increased from 2.8% in 1979 to 10.1% by 1983. Call loans to
Korean banks, in particular, grew rapidly between 1982 and 1983,
but decreased absolutely during 1984 (down to 5.7% of total
assets), probably because of liquidity improvements in the
condition of the domestic banks. Their importance relative to
loans and discounts is minor, as illustrated by Table 5.
Table 6 gives the relative position of foreign banks in the
Korean banking industry. As foreign banks have limited branch
networks to attract local currency deposits, their share in local
currency deposits has therefore been very low (around 1.3%).
Foreign banks' share in local currency loans is also very low,
averaging out around 5.5% during 1980-1984. Contrarily, their
share in foreign currency loans trended up from 46.3% in 1980 to
61.5% in 1984, indicating the increasing involvement of foreign
banks in the financing of imports, especially machines and
equipment that are essential for the development of the Korean
economy. Their share in foreign currency deposits also shows an
upward trend from 3.7% in 1980 to 21.3% in 1984. This keeps in
line with the growing share of foreign currency loans as foreign
banks demand compensation balances from their clients.
Profitability
Table 7 illustrates the return on total assets tor the iouL
types of deposit money banks, namely, foreign banks, nation-wide
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commercial banks, local banks, and specialized banks between 1977
and 1984. 1
There is a tendency for the profitability
differential to widen in favour of foreign banks over time. One
exception is 1980 when profitability of foreign banks dropped and
the profitability differential narrowed, but then the subsequent
years experienced a very rapid widening in the differential. This
may indicate that foreign banks are more capable of taking profit
opportunities during economic recovery than domestic banks, as 1980
was a recession year for the banking sector. 1
Foreign banks with the exception of nine Japanese banks
netted 80,670 million Won (roughly US$90.6 million) in combined
profits in 1985, up 34.8% from 59,860 million Won (US$69.2 million
in 1984. 2 Among the foreign banks operating in the nation, US
banks were best in business performance in 1985, taking the top
seven positions (see Table 8). In the meantime, the five
commercial banks- Hanil, Commercial Bank of Korea, Bank of Seoul,
Cho Hung Bank and Korea First Bank- registered a mere 38,800
million Won in net profits in 1985, down 46.1% from 72,000 million
Won in 1984. Their performance is attributable to the fact that
they set aside a large amount of the 1985 profits for loan loss
3
reserves.
Such a profitable business enjoyed by most foreign banks is
the outcome of several interrelating factors including ownership
"Foreign Banking in South Korea", an article written by Dr.
1 HO Yan-ki, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985.
"Performance of Foreign Banks", Newsreview, April 19, 1986,
2
p.20.




advantages, supply side imperfection, and deliberate government
policies that often worked to foreign banks' advantages. 1
Ownership advantage of foreign banks
Foreign banks are usually multi-national corporations with a
long history of banking operations. Such experience enables them
to develop a highly efficient working process which can be
standardized and transferred abroad. Hence, foreign banks can
employ local personnel to carry out the production process.
Supply side imperfection
Foreign banks are in a position to tap worldwide funding
sources through their multi-national branch networks, which are
less readily available to the Korean counterparts. The export-led
economy of Korea plus disturbances due to the oil shocks and
recession made Korea a thirsty absorber of foreign funds. Foreign
currency funds are thus more valuable than domestic currency
funds. With global accessibility to foreign currency fund, foreign
banks can compete more effectively with local banks.
Foreign Banks' Privileges
Lastly is the given privileges that local banks cannot enjoy
which are granted to foreign banks. For example, the swap
arrangement is a safe means 'to increase foreign banks' operational
expenditures without worrying about the risks of foreign exchange
exposures. Besides, their default risk is also minimized as
"Foreign Banking in South Korea", an article written by Dr.
HO Yan-ki, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985.1.
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foreign banks usually require a payment guarantee from domestic
banks or the principal firm of the same industry group, and they
are supposed to commit only 25% of their lending portfolio to
small- or medium-sized companies, making it possible to concentrate
their loans on creditworthy large enterprises, which in turn reduce
their credit risks. Conversely, the comparable percentages for
Korean commercial and provincial banks recently stands at 35% and
80% respectively.
The Korean Government seems to believe the support which it
gives to foreign banks is reasonable, considering the direct and
indirect contribution they make to improve Korea's economy. The
direct contribution is the sum of their operation fund A and their
swap transactions- a significant conduit for the country to obtain
foreign currency. Equally important has been the indirect
contribution made by the foreign banks in assisting Korean
companies importing foreign resources.
As long as all the foregoing factors remain effective, the
Korean market will continue to be profitable to foreign banks.
Recent Changes Affecting Foreign Banks
Despite what may be considered a successful performance of
foreign banks in the ROK, recent financial changes, however, are
likely to affect the future operations of foreign banks.
To make the Korean financial system more efficient, the
Korean Government has promoted a policy of financial liberalization
since 1982. The objectives of the policy are to increase
competition in the domestic financial market and to prepare for
full internationalization of the Korean financial sector.
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Starting from March 1, 1985, foreign banks are given access
to the central bank's rediscount facilities for export financing.
This provision provides foreign banks with an additional channel to
obtain local currency apart from the traditional channels- the
swap arrangement and local currency deposits. The rediscount
facilities will also extend to other businesses such as commercial
paper in 1986. In addition, foreign banks have been allowed to
join the trust business from July 1985, a market in which the
domestic commercial banks only became active in themselves during
1984. The Bank of Korea is also allowing the foreign banks to sell
CDs (certificates of deposit) for the first time in 1986 as a means
to slow money supply growth.
Nevertheless, the exclusive privileges enjoyed by foreign
banks will be withdrawn in step with the restructuring to bring
them into the same domestic environment as the local banks. Funds
obtained from the swap arrangement will be reduced gradually. For
1985, the swap ceiling has declined by 50% of the total local
currency raised through the central bank rediscount facility. In
1986, the ceiling is going to decrease further by 75%, thereby
gradually reducing the swap fund. At the same time, the official
margin which foreign banks are permitted to make on swap
transactions (currently 0.75) will be completely removed sometime
after 1986. Thus the benefit that foreign banks could obtain by
swap transactions will be very much confined and, increasingly,
they will have to bear foreign exchange risk if they want to use
foreign currency to do local business.
Starting from March 1985, foreign banks are also required to
allocate 25% of their incremental loans to small-and medium-sized
companies (previously defined as firms with 100 employees, but now
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raised to 300 1). In future, foreign banks will be classified,
at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance, in the 'A' or 'B'
category. Class 'A' banks will have to devote 35% of their
portfolio to small- and medium-sized borrowers (and will get
rediscount-window access), while class 'B' banks will continue to
lend 25% to this category without the cheap government finance. As
a matter of fact, foreign banks' clients are usually multinational
firms, large conglomerates and the states. Dealing with these
large entities which need a wider range of services than smaller
ones is to the advantage of foreign banks, let alone the
availability of enough financial information for evaluating their
clients' credit risks. Conversely, foreign banks may not be in a
position to deal with small- and medium-sized companies partly
because of the difficulties in evaluating the creditworthiness of
these companies and partly because of the limited branch networks
of foreign banks to keep in close contact with these clients.
Hence, it appears that foreign banks will have difficulties in
transferring their ownership advantage to this market, which in
turn may force foreign banks to produce high cost products to suit
this market.
Moreover, in 1986, foreign banks like domestic banks will
also be required to contribute to the Korea Credit Guarantee
Fund 1 equal to 0.3% of their incremental loans in local
currency. This provision would definitely raise the cost of
capital for domestic currency loans.
Equal Rights Means The Freedom To Make Losses, Far Eastern
1. Economic Review, August 21, 1986, p.67.
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Indeed, the pursuance of the financial liberalization has
constituted a basic change in the competitive structure of the
Korean banking environment, with domestic banks starting to have
more leeway to compete with foreign banks. But will these
financial changes discourage the expansion of foreign banks in the
ROK in the years ahead? In the next section, we would present the
information obtained from our questionnaire survey, and try to





In the ensuing paragraphs, we are going to analyse the
responses to the two sets of questionnaire sent to the foreign bank
branches/representative offices in the ROK and to those in Hong
Kong which do not have a presence in the ROK. In addition, we have
also summarized the findings in Appendix 5.
Questionnaires Sent to Foreign Banks in the ROK
In this set of questionnaires, we have covered all the
branches and representative offices of the foreign banks in the
nation (refer to chapter II: Methodology). With the aim to
encourage the sample banks to answer the questionnaire, we have
simplified our questionnaire by minimizing the number of questions
and designing more closed end questions as shown in Appendix 2.
Most encouragingly, the response rate stood high at 31.6%; out of
the 58 sets of questionnaire mailed to all foreign banks in the
ROK, and 19 sets were received, one of which was mailed back
unanswered.
Basic Information
There are 5 American banks, 4 Japanese banks, 6 European
banks, 2 Australian banks and 1 Singaporian bank amongst the 18
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answered questionnaires. These banks (15 of which are branches and
only 3 are representative offices) have their years of operation in
the ROK from 3 to 19 years, with an average history of 8 years.
Therefore, we could say that these respondent banks (the banks)
have pretty good experience in the ROK banking business.
Amongst the banks, there are only two which have their
regional headquarters in Hong Kong and two in Tokyo, with the
remaining in their home offices. Concerning the scale of
operation, the number of employees in the banks ranges from 3 to
170, with an average population of 38. As mentioned earlier, since
foreign banks can only set up at most two branches in the nation
(with one in Seoul and another in Pusan), we are not surprised to
see a relatively small scale of operation in terms of the human
resource level.
The last question on this part concerns the banks' motives
to set up offices in the country. The answers could be classified
into three main streams:
The ROK business, as considered by foreign bankers, is1.
of higher profitability and lower risk level as compared
with other Asian countries. This is especially true for
international trade activities, from which banks could
usually reap a good profit.
The ROK is a strategic location for penetrating the
2.
Asian Pacific Region.
The ROK is a prospective market with many business
3.
opportunities. The demand for foreign funds is great,
and there is room for further growth.
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Banking Activities
We have listed eight types of major banking activities and
asked for the banks' opinions. To sum up our findings, we observe
that trade financing and corporate financing (for domestic clients)
are the two important types of business that the banks are
undertaking. For trade financing, the major markets are, in the
following order of importance: the U.S.A., European countries,
Japan and Canada. As the States has been the biggest importing
country of ROK products, trade financing deals between the two
countries is a profit centre for the banks.
Loan syndication comes behind the foregoing two types of
business. We agree with the ranking as loan demands in these days
have been much lower than they were a few years ago. Lately the
Ministry of Finance has also imposed a temporary ban on overseas
borrowing, which means that loan syndication is now at a low level
for foreign banks.
Corporate financing for parent country clients doing
business in the ROK: money market/foreign exchange dealing and
underwriting/swaps are ranked a medium degree of importance by the
banks. Bonds dealing, being an unpopular banking business with a
narrow market in the nation, is ranked "4" retail banking as well
as consultation services are ranked the least important amongst the
eight banking activities.
Banking Environment in the ROK
In this section, the questions we asked fall into five
categories. After analysing the responses, we note that the
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foreign bankers are not at all happy with the excessive government
intervention in the financial sector. Nevertheless, for one reason
or another, only a few of them express dissatisfaction. Most of
the banks are neutral or even vote for an optimistic outlook in
their replies.
Internationalization of the Financial Market
In this part, the banks express their opinions that the ROK
government does provide incentives to foreign investment, but are
neutral to the likeliness that the Government will be more active
in promoting banking business in the country. Concerning the
financial system in the future, the banks do not agree nor disagree
that it is changing towards a more efficient system.
Government Control on Foreign Banks
The banks all agree that banking restrictions such as the
imposition of a swaps ceiling are very unfavourable towards their
business. Profitability is much lower now than a few years ago.
While for the recent restrictions on capital movements,
repatriation of earnings and interest, they state that the
situation is still acceptable.
Permission to use the Central Bank's rediscount facilities
for export financing, however, does not necessarily provide a good
source for local currency to foreign banks. Bankers do not feel
that the setting up of trust funds will weaken the dominance of
foreign banks as suppliers of foreign currencies.
Operations
The banks agree that competition from domestic banks does
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exist that it is not as severe as the competition amongst
themselves (foreign banks).
It is very difficult for foreign banks to secure Won funds
through the domestic market, which weakens their competition with
local banks. Concerning the demand for foreign funds and the
creditability of the ROK borrowers, the banks consider that demand
as well as creditability levels are acceptable. In general,
quality of loans to Korean companies is good.
Last but not the least, the banks are neutral on the opinion
that the cost of running an office in the country is high and that
foreign banks have little difficulty in securing qualified
personnel.
Banking environment now and in 1990
In this question, the respondents had to rank the level of
favourability of the banking environment in the ROK. The banks
are, on the whole, happy with the present environment and
atmosphere of investing in the nation. Nevertheless, they are more
conservative towards the banking environment in 1990. They
anticipate that foreign banks will be in a quite unfavourable
situation by then.
Profitability
The banks consider that the present profitability of running
the banking business in the nation is at a reasonable level. The
high profit margins of those banking activities such as swaps and
loans enhance high profitability. The low level of bad loans also
generates a high rate of return for most of the foreign banks.
Government support (especially to foreign banks) as well as the
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good investment atmosphere in the country also explains their high
profitability.
Potential Banking Activities
Different from last two sections on the profitabilities of
banking activities, we asked the bankers' opinions towards the
future banking opportunities in this section.
Basically, the order of importance in this question does fit
with what we learned earlier. Corporate finance is expected to be
the prime business opportunity for the banks. However, money
market activities and securities investments (somewhat related to
speculative business) will dominate in the years ahead, which in
fact has been a new banking direction all over the world.
Nevertheless, the investment business in the ROK is still at a
preliminary stage, and we wonder whether the Government, which has
been keeping a close eye on the industry, is happy to accept such
less beneficial banking activities towards the national GNP growth.
Outlook of Banking Operations in the ROK
More than half of the banks (10 out of 18) state that they
will maintain the present scale of operation in the nation. Four
of the banks expect to scale down the present size of their
operation in due course, while the remaining four consider that
there is still significant potential for their banks to expand.
Difficulties Faced by the Banks
To complete the questionnaire, we asked the banks Lne
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specific difficulties that they would expect in the business. To
sum up, we would list the types of difficulties in the order of
importance, which is based on the frequency of the responses
covered:
Government control on financial sector (e.g. swap1
ceilings, lending ratio, compulsory lending to small-
and medium-sized firms), which is especially
disadvantageous towards foreign banks.
Political instability. Banks are exposed to risk due to2
changes in political structure.
Difficulty of access to Won currency, which weakens3,
their competitive edges over local banks towards the
domestic banking business.
Diminishing demand for foreign funds.4.
Government restrictions on foreign loans in order to
5.
improve the country's balance of payments.
Competitions amongst foreign banks themselves, and with
6
local banks and other financial institutions.
Less secured loan nowadays, increasing risk exposures
7,
towards bad debts.
Refinancing of old loans with high interest rates by new
8
agreements with low interest rates.
Questionnaires Sent to Foreign Banks
Without a Presence in the ROK
In this set of questionnaires, we surveyed a random sample
of branches and representative offices of the foreign banks that
have no presence in the ROK (refer to chapter II: Methodology).
Again, with the objective to encourage the sample banks to answer
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the questionnaire, we have simplified our questionnaire by
minimizing the number of questions and by designing more closed end
questions, which is illustrated in Appendix 3. Since the
questionnaire is simple and short in length (one page only), the
response rate was even higher than the previous set: 37.5% versus
31.6%. Out of the 50 sets of questionnaire mailed out, 18 sets
were received, two of which were returned unanswered.
Major Reasons of Not Setting Up a
Banking Presence in the ROK
Most of the banks mention that there is already a lot of ROK
business opportunities available to them despite that they do not
have a physical presence in the country. At the moment, they are
usually invited to participate or sub-participate in loan
syndications by the syndication managers and participants. Second
to this point is their worry about the political instability of the
country.
Lacking business experience in the Korean market and the
uncertainty of generating reasonable profit also deters bankers
from setting up a branch in the ROK. In addition, some of the
respondents express pessimism over the prospects of foreign banks
in the years ahead.
Anticipation of the ROK of being a Lender Insteaa
of a Borrower Country in 1990:
As there is a saying that the ROK will become a lenaer
instead of a borrower country in the near future, we therefore
asked the bankers' opinions on this point. Amongst the responses,
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there was no bank expressing such anticipation. Most of the
bankers responded "most unlikely", and a few chose a neutral
position. In line with what we have previously mentioned, the
demand for foreign funds will be largely in place in the next few
years, but there is likely to be a diminishing demand for big
borrowings.
Banking Activities in the ROK
All of the banks said that they have already had some
participation in the ROK banking business. In ranking these
off-shore banking activities in terms of the degree of importance,
loan syndications and trade financing are extensively conducted.
On the whole, trade finance is dealt mainly for the USA, the Asian
countries, the Middle East countries, etc. The banks are also
involved in corporate finance like underwriting, swaps, money
market and foreign exchange dealings for domestic clients.
Profitability
Concerning the profitability of the abovementioned business,
all banks agreed that the profitability is reasonably good to very
good. The reasons are mainly twofold: 1. good loan spreads and
fees and 2. low risk (loans are usually very secured).
Potential Banking Activities
The banks responded that that the most prosperous banking
opportunities for foreign banks in the ROK are, in the order of
importance: corporate financing, loan syndication, trade financing
and capital market business.
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Difficulties Faced by the Banks
To end this questionnaire, we asked the banks the specific
difficulties that they would expect in the future. To sum up, we
list here the types of difficulties in the order of importance,
which is based on the frequency of the responses covered:
Political instability, especially the uncertainty about1
the political atmosphere by 1988.
Excessive foreign debt burden, making it dubious whether2.
the country has adequate repaying ability.
Volatile trade pattern, making it uncertain whether the3
ROK can maintain a high growth in exports.
Government restrictions on foreign banks' activities in4
the nation.
Lack of Won funds for foreign banks.5
Lack of qualified personnel in banking.6
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CHAPTER VI OPPORTUNITIES THREATS
The dynamic development of the Korean banking industry is
indeed a mixed blessing to foreign bankers. In this chapter, we
will identify the threats and opportunities that are facing foreign
banks in the years ahead.
Threats Facing Foreign Banks
Decrease in Sovereign Borrowing
In view of the country's improving balance-of-payments, the
ROK has started cutting back on foreign borrowing in 1986. In
August 1986, the country has temporarily frozen all foreign loans.
In the meantime, the Foreign Capital Inducement Act was tightened
up to specify seven industries 1 as eligible for seeking overseas
funds. As a matter of fact, the government had originally planned
to introduce a total of US$5.7 billion in short- and long-term
foreign loans in 1986 however, only US$1.5 billion in loans had
2
been arranged during the first eight months of 1986.
The sign of a slowdown in overseas borrowing has alerted
The seven industries include vehicle manuracturing,
1. electronics, construction of nuclear power station, steel,
mechanical instrument, leasing and foreign joint-venture
projects.
"Korea's Hunger For Loans May Be Over", The Asian Wall
2, Street Journal, August 27, 1986.
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bankers of the diminishing business opportunities. This agrees
with our findings in both questionnaires number one and two (see
chapter 5). In addition, as the global interest rates remain low,
ROK borrowers have been prepaying old obligations carrying high
interest rates and replacing them with new loan terms at floating
interest rates or fixed at lower interest rates. Hence, some
foreign bankers say the bulk of their business in 1987 will be the
refinancing of old loans rather than brand new borrowings. It
appears that the country is entering an era in which foreign
bankers will be operating in a much diminished market for lending
to the country. Above all, the ROK is relying more on
self-generated funding. Along with credit-tightening measures,
Seoul is moving to replace bank financing by providing and
encouraging new methods of raising money for investment, such as
the issuance of corporate bonds, commercial paper, debentures and
other monetary instruments. "Korea in the past has placed the
heaviest reliance on syndicated borrowings. But securities now can
be used for large amounts"- commented by a foreign banker in the
ROK. 1
The amount of corporate financing through stocks and
corporate bonds in 1972 was just 24.7 billion Won but this
increased to 3,471 billion Won in 1985, and the respondent banks in
our questionnaires considered that this activity should rank first
among all banking activities. The number of firms listed in the
stock market increased to 342 firms from 66 in 1970, and the
aggregate market value of listed stocks jumped from 246 billion
"Korea's Hunger For Loans May Be Over", The Asian wall
1. Street Journal, August 27, 1986.
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Won to 6,570 billion Won over the same period, which means an
average annual growth of 28.7%. In the bond market, 2,749 issues
of corporate bonds have been listed since 1972, when only 116
issues were initially listed. The aggregate value of listed
corporate bonds at the end of 1985 has also increased to 7,263
billion Won. Table 9 shows the corporate funds raised on the
securities market since 1972.
In 1986, two convertibles were sold successfully in the
Euromarket at fairly competitive prices and terms. Daewoo Heavy
Industries ended up with a 50% fixed conversion premium, while
Samsung Electronics became the first Korean company to issue a
1 The market's warmconvertible with a flexible premium.
acceptance of these two issues could be interpreted as a sign of
hot interest in Korean equities, and this financing method might be
one of the efforts to improve the debt structure of Korean
companies and reduce their previously heavy reliance on bank
loans. The success of the two issues will probably encourage
Korean companies to tap other European markets such as Switzerland
or Germany, via straight bonds at a lower cost, in the future.
Financial officials also hope some of those instruments will
mobilize domestic savings more effectively, which have reached a
record level in 1986. According to the central bank, domestic
savings by the government, business enterprises and the public
accounted for about 32% of gross national product in November
2 With a great improvement in savings, the nation can
1986.
certainly
"Capital Market Deregulation Stays On Right Track," Asiar.
1
Finance, July 15, 1986, p.64.
"Seoul's Muddled Course Nettles Bankers", The Asian Wall
2. Street Journal, December 15, 1986.
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provide financial sources for domestic investment without relying
on foreign savings. In other words, the country will not need
borrowings from abroad to make up for the deficit in domestic
investment as happened in the past. In short, the diversification
of the sources of foreign capital would probably make the
government tougher in negotiations with foreign organizations. In
the past, foreign banks knew that Korea needed their help, but now
they expect a tougher official climate given that the current
account is running a surplus.
Structure of Foreign Debt
Though a considerable amount of progress is being made in
solving the problem of foreign debts, there are still some problems
concerning external liabilities. The first is the ratio between
floating and fixed rates. As of September 1986, the ROK's debts
consist of 31% in fixed rates and the remainder in floating rates
connected to international interbank offered rates. An approximate
$300 million additional burden would occur whenever the
international rates increases by 1%. 1 In short, the present
situation is indeed very fragile. Any increase in international
borrowing rates would result in a higher interest rate burden which
would definitely affect the economic growth of the country.
National Treatment Program
The recent series of the 'national treatment program' would
"Nation Makes Sound Improvement in Sturcture of Foreign
1, Debt", The Korea Times, September 2, 1986.
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probably skim off business profits of foreign banks in future. The
most controversial one is the enforcement that 35% of a foreign
bank's new lending should be granted to small- and medium-sized
businesses. Not only do the foreign banks have limited experience
in dealing with this new customer's profile but also they would
have the difficulty in obtaining adequate credit information from
these borrowers as most Korean companies are not used to giving out
information. Therefore, bankers usually have to rely on the
companies' published reports to assess its financial strength. Yet
those information do not usually give the full picture. For
instance, a diversified Korean company does not always produce a
consolidated account hence, there is no way to know how its
subsidiaries are doing. Therefore commitment to lend to small- and
medium-sized companies would increase the credit risk for the banks
as these companies, as compared with large enterprises, tend to be
more sensitive to the release of information.
Besides, these companies have on average much higher
debt-to-equity ratios than those in other Asian countries. 1 For
example, the ratio for Tong II Company, a maker of automobile
parts, had a debt-to-equity ratio of 10.77 at the end of 1985.
Therefore, the banks have to be very cautious in lending to these
companies and be constantly keeping a close eye on borrowers'
operations.
The opening of certificate-of-deposit markets also turns out
to be a mixed blessing as a bank sells every dollar in CDs, it has
to give up a dollar of its swap allowance. Furthermore, the
"Bourse's Pitfalls Making Analysts Wary of Korea", The Asian
1. Wall Street Journal, October 17, 1986.
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authority's intention to completely phase out swap facilities over
the next 3 or 4 years would certainly restrain foreign banks'
profiteering and, above all, limit their access to Won funds which
certainly restrict their activities in Won lending. Indeed, such
worries of increasing difficulty to raise Won funds and narrowing
profit from swap arrangements are raised by bankers in our
questionnaire survey. Foreign bankers hence viewed the
arrangements with scepticism, with one pointing out that "under the
guise of granting us more flexibility in fund raising, they have
succeeded in restraining us more than ever." 1 In fact, we do
worry that the Government would further enforce regulations that
are unfavourable to foreign banks' operations in the nation.
Keen Competition
Foreign banks would probably be facing a very competitive
environment, in addition to the existing strong competition among
foreign banks themselves (see chapter 5 for the banks' responses).
As the authority starts to enforce the 'national treatment
programme', foreign banks would have to compete on an equal footing
with domestic banks. The indigenous banks, which have been subject
to burdens such as making government policy loans, financial
bail-out operations, payment guarantees, and government
interferences, would be in a better position to challenge their
foreign counterparts in the years ahead. Concomitant with that
would surely be the increasing competition among the foreign banks
themselves. While some banks, especially the American ones, are
"Seoul's Restraints Anger Foreign Banks", The Asian Wall
1. Street Journal, December 16, 1986.
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hesitant about extending their business, Japanese banks are now
active in expanding their business in the ROK. The Japanese, who
have traditionally remained far behind other foreigners in lending
to Seoul have shown growing interest over the past two years.
Improving political relations between the two countries has
smoothed the way for greater Japanese confidence in the Korean
economy despite the historical hostile relationship between the two
nationalities. The strengthened Yen has also given the Japanese
banks greater lending capabilities and a stronger incentive to
invest in the ROK. Indeed, the Japanese banks have added an extra
force to an already competitive market, especially on notes issues
and other new forms of finance such as overseas issues of
convertible bonds. For instance, the Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan has become a strong supporter of Hyundai Engineering and
Construction issues of convertible bonds (the bond is likely to be
floated in early 1987) despite the well-known problems of Korean
construction firms. Given such a keen competitive environment,
foreign banks will become aggressive in enticing Korean companies
by offering favourable lending terms or lowering commission rates
and fees, which will certainly squeeze their profit margins.
Political Climate
As stated by a risk consultancy firm 1, the ROK's
political situation will continue to be marked by uncertainty and
will go through its most demanding test since 1980, as the
Issue No. e9,Quarterly Country Risk Surthrou- The Republic
1. Outlook for October 1986 through March 1987, Issue No. 9,
PE Risk Consultancy, Ltd.
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opposition and the government will have less room to manoeuvre and
time will run out for a compromise. Appendix 6 lists the analysts'
ratings of the socio-political prognosis of the country from
October 1986 to March 1987. 1988 is considered as a testing year
for international credit perception of the nation as the Olympics
and the nation-wide presidential election are scheduled to be held
in that year. The major political issues facing the country will
be whether President Chun Doo Hwan fulfills his promise to step
down from the Presidency at the end of current term in 1988 and
whether or not the military will accept a gradual diminution of its
political role. In order for these events to take place, a formula
for the political transition will have to be devised under which
the military's key role in Korean society- an outgrowth of the
hostile North-South division of Korea- is reconciled with the
rapidly rising popular support for civilian rule. If such a
formula cannot be devised, or factions within the military refuse
to share power with civilians, then a military coup d'etat could
bring another military-dominated regime to power in 1988 or
before. A coup at this point in time would create a period of
political instability and weaken business confidence. Our survey
finds out that the political instability of the nation is one of
the key factors restraining some banks from setting up a banking
presence in the country (see findings in our questionnaire set 2).
Given such an uncertain political environment, foreign bankers will
find it hard to make medium and long term plans.
International Economic Environment
On top of that, as the country is an export-orienzea
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economy, any downturn in the international market would adversely
affect the Korean economy, especially when the three-lows
phenomenon (low oil price, low interest rate and low dollar value)
does not exist. Indeed, the increase of US$2,040 million in the
current account during the first seven months of 1986 over the
comparable period of 1985 came from lower oil prices (US$1,030
million), lower international interest rates (US$200 million), and
the competitive improvement of domestic industries (US$800
million). 1 Hence, it is obvious that the levels of oil price
and interest rates have a great impact on Korean current account.
Though the international economic environment is predicted to be
favourable to the country in general, there are uncertainties and
unfavourable factors which hinder the medium and long term
prospects for the world economy. For example, the growing tendency
in advocating protectionism amongst the developed countries, the
high levels of unemployment in these countries, and the increasing
fierceness of market competition will also aggravate trade
friction.
Taxation
Amongst the four little dragons in Asia (i.e. Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), South Korea's corporate tax
rates are not at all attractive towards foreign investors. This is
also an obstacle to the high growth in exports as well as to
overseas investment. For instance, the tax rates for listed small
"Nation Makes Sound Improvement in Structure of Foreign
1. Debt", The Korea Times, September 2, 1986.
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and large companies (on the Korean stock exchange) are 20 and 33
percent respectively; while for the unlisted companies, the rates
are 20 and 30 percent. 1
To compare with that of the other three dragons, Hong Kong
has its corporate tax rate at 18.5 percent, and is going down to 18
percent in 1987 Taiwan has a very low rate of only 15.25 percent;
while for Singapore, the rate is the highest among the four-- 33
percent.
As the ROK has been advocating the target to achieve high
export growth and GDP growth, and a low inflation rate, the high
tax rate surely weakens its competitive edge with the two better
"grown-up" dragons-- Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Revaluation of Won
One of the objectives of Korean economy policy has been to
sustain the growth in exports. This also has been an aim of the
country's exchange rate policy. The real exchange rate indicates
the price of foreign goods relative to Korean goods in the world
market. It has a significant impact on the determination of the
amount of Korean exports. To boost its export business, Seoul has
resorted to devaluations of Won currency since 1960s. Table 10
shows the changes in the nominal exchange rate of the Korean Won
vis-a-vis the US dollar from 1964 through 1986. Table 11
illustrates the exchange rate of the Won currency against the US
dollar from mid 1984 until 1986 as compared with some other Asian




In assessing the advisability of Won revaluations, the first
thing to explore is whether it can be done without affecting
Korea's overall balance of payments. If the Korean Won can rise in
value relative to the U.S. dollar and at the same time fall
relatively to other currencies, the balance of payments need not be
affected. However, this is not possible for a minor currency like
the Korean Won since its value relative to major currencies changes
only passively. Hence, the revaluation will affect all of Korea's
external transactions and the country's balance of payments will
1
inevitably deteriorate.
Given the export boom in 1986, the Won currency is expected
to be stronger in the forthcoming year. Besides, the US Government
is pressuring the nation to raise the Won's value against the US
dollar in order to help balance two-way trade (Korean exports to
the States in the first eight months of 1986 rose to US$8.7 billion
while imports from the US mounted only to US$4.45 billion.)
Lately, according to the daily Hankook Ilbo, South Korea is under
strong American protectionist pressure and has decided to allow the
Won to appreciate against the US dollar by six percent by the end
of 1987 2 while the States aimed to push Seoul to appreciate its
Won currency by 15 percent with respect to the US dollar by the end
of 1987.3
"Should Korea Revalue The Won", Yoo Jungho, Korea Business
1.
World, November 1986.
"South Korea plans 6% rise in Won", South China Morning
2,
Post, February 27, 1987.




Under the circumstances, Won currency would be forced to
appreciate with respect to the U.S. dollar. Its competitive
advantage in exporting, when comparing to its major competitors
like Hong Kong, which is not under such a revaluation pressure, is
unavoidably weakening. As Korea depends considerably on imports
and exports, amounting to 80 percent of the nation's total output,
the Won's revaluation will prove detrimental to the nation's
balance of payment as well as to its loan repaying ability.
Opportunities Facing Foreign Banks
International Credit Rating
Despite the mounting domestic political opposition and the
threat from North Korea, the ROK was still rated as good and ranked
32nd out of 119 countries (rated with a score of 70.65 points out
of 100) according to the Euromoney Country Risk Ratings in 1985
whereas the Institutional Investor 1985 Country Credit ratings
ranked ROK 29th out of 109 countries with a score of 57.3 points
out 100. The 1986 country risk survey done by the Nikon Bonds and
Debentures Research Institute of Japan further demonstrated the
international credibility of the ROK as the country was ranked 27th
among 100 countries. Indeed, the ROK has the encouraging growth
prospect for 1987 among the major Asian Pacific countries as shown
in chart 1 of Appendix 7. Early industrialization and the
existence of a sizable domestic market (a population of about 40
million people) give the country an edge over its competitors like
Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Despite an upsurge in domestic
political opposition in 1986, the ROK has the comparative advantage
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of relative political certainty- there are no succession problems
in the ROK while Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan all face some sort
of future political uncertainty.
Though Korea's external debt is the fourth largest in the
world, its debt service ratio (the ratio of debt service payments
to foreign exchange earnings, which measures the country's ability
to make payments on schedule) is well below those of other
developing countries and compares favourably with those of Latin
American countries such as Brazil and Mexico. Table 12 shows that
the nation's debt service ratio in 1980 is about average at 12.2
percent and is considered to be reasonable. Table 13 presents the
debt profile and service ratio up to 1985. In view of the
reasonable ratios shown, the country's ability to borrow has not
yet been impaired, but it probably depends crucially on its current
and expected future ability to grow and to make exports grow.
Based on the 1986 export performance (exports mounted to US$34.7
billion earning a trade surplus of US$3.51 billion Table 14 shows
the favourable change in balance-of-payments between 1985 and
1986), the prospect of Korea's exports is encouraging. Korean
Economic Planning Minister Kim Mahn-Je has predicted exports in
1987 to hit a record high of US$39 billion, which would widen the
trade surplus to US$3.7 billion.1 The Government's Sixth-Year
Economic and Social Development Plan also predicts that exports
will grow by an average annual rate of 11.2% to US$54.4 billion in
1991, and imports by 10.9% to US$51.9 billion on a customer
"Seoul Working To Aid Troubled Domestic Banks", The Asian
1. Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1986.
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clearance basis.1 Hence, to foreign bankers, lending to the
country appears to be acceptable in terms of level of risk.
Demand for Foreign Funds
Despite the pause in the ROK's borrowing program, it is
expected that the country will continue to seek huge amounts of
funding from overseas. To sustain the economy, they (Koreans)
have got to keep investing substantial amounts of money, as stated
by a foreign banker.2 This view has been reaffirmed by the
comment of the Finance Minister that the ROK will remain in the
market as a regular borrower of substantial amounts, though there
will be no more sharp increases in gross borrowing.3 Just
looking at the refinancing of debt coming due in 1986, the country
already needs an estimated US$1.8 billion. Therefore, the lending
market should still have room for foreign banks, which is also the
general consensus of the banking business players as observed from
our questionnaire survey.
Difficulty in Equity Financing
Though equity financing has been increasingly important in
recent years, there are still a number of obstacles preventing the
full development of the market. First, from the issuer's
"Foreign Banks In Korea", Monthly Review, Korea Exchange
1.
Bank, May 1986.
"Korea's Hunger For Loans May Be Over", The Asian Wall
2. Street Journal, August 27, 1986.
"Equal Rights Means The Freecom To Make Losses", Far Eastern
3. Economic Review, August 21, 1986, p.62.
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standpoint, the cost of a bond issue is more than that of a bank
loan, and alternative financing vehicles for long-term funds have
not been fully developed. Investors basically do not prefer
corporate IOUs of terms longer than 5 years. In addition, most
corporate treasurers enjoyed the benefits of relatively lower
interest rates under the favourable financing terms designed for
strategic industries selected by the government. Presently, the
most popular type of corporate bonds is a guaranteed issue with a
maturity ranging from 3 to 5 years. The coupon rate is pegged to
the 1-year time deposit rate offered by commercial banks. In this
regard, with the fixed commission of about 1% paid to financiers to
get a guarantee, the actual cost for issuing bonds stands at about
147 per annum which far exceeds the Korean prime rate of 10.570.1
Secondly, stock offerings have become a very sensitive
matter to major shareholders who do not want to lose control of
their company and let their equity be diluted. Worst of all, new
issues have been sold at par regardless of the market price of the
company's shares. It was only in 1984 that the government
introduced a system of mark pricing for equity in the primary
market.
Thirdly, some corporate borrowers also worry about the risk
of being unable to get a sympathetic hearing from lenders in times
of trouble which may be available in a traditional bank-client
relationship, if they securitize their debts.
Lastly, the ratio of aggregate market value to GNP was 9.1%
in 1985, which is low in comparison with industrialized countries.
The ratio of stock investors to total population was a mere 1.6% in
Asian Finance, July 15, 1986, p.64.
"Profile- Korea",1.
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1985. The corresponding figures for Japan and the U.S. are far
higher than 10%. Also, the price earnings ratio (P/E ratio)
remains low, at 5.6 at the end of 1985, compared with 12.0 in the
U.S. and 35.1 in Japan. In short, despite the impressive growth
figures for the securities market, it still needs further maturing
before the country can depend on it.
Troubled Domestic Banks
Government Intervention
Years of state-planned industrial growth hobbled the banking
sector's development and saddled it with a variety of problems.
Chief among them are government intervention, a dearth of good
managers and an abundance of bad debts. There is too much
involvement of the government in the banking industry. For
instance, it appoints the managers of the five biggest commercial
domestic banks, and it instructs the banks who they should lend to,
how much they should lend, when they should lend, and what interest
rates they have to charge. Though the authority has stated that it
would make financial policies more market-oriented in the future,
its efforts to break its interventionist habits have been
inconsistent, yielding confusion and further problems. Indeed, Mr.
Park Sung-Sang, Governor of Bank of Korea, once commented that
"control by the government of the financial sector will be a
permanent feature of the economy until we become a developed
1
nation".
"Seoul's Muddled Course Nettles Bankers", The Asian Wall
1. Street Journal, December 15, 1986.
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Though the authority has said that it would reduce its
direct role in appointing high-ranking commercial-bank officials,
there is also the problem of hiring qualified managers. The
departure of state-appointed officials means the banks need better
managers than they have had. It is doubtful where qualified
management will come from when Korean bankers have never been
allowed to function commercially-- making risk assessments on the
basis of balance sheets rather than by government decree.
Ineffective operation
In order to get an optimal return in a rapidly growing and
highly competitive banking environment, domestic banks have to
develop a variety of innovative banking products yielding a higher
return and ensuring safety and liquidity. It is crucial for them
to upgrade their traditional banking operations such as loan
screening procedures and financial research in order to be able to
survive in the highly competitive market. To serve as an
illustration, the magnitude of bad loans facing the domestic banks
dampens their growth in the coming years. The banks are found to
be holding an estimated US$5 billion in failed policy loans at the
end of 1986, constituting nearly 12% of the total lending of the
whole system.1 Hence, it would take some time before they can be
back onto a sound business track.
"The Korean banking market is changing, with its system
evolving into universal banking and the global public becoming
sensitized to changes in yields on a variety of new banking
"Seoul Working To Aid Troubled Domestic Banks", The Asian
1. Wall Street Journal, December 17, 1986.
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products" 1, which is the general view of many domestic bankers
who attended the third annual banking seminar in mid October 1986
in Seoul. The global trend in the finance market suggests that
Korea may be gradually evolving into a universal banking system
under which each financial market participant can conduct a variety
of financial businesses.
Government's Auspices
During our interviews with some of the experts in the ROK
banking business, the bankers told us some rumours on the ROK
financial industry. Actually, most of them do not believe that the
government will give up its control of the semi-state-owned banking
sector.
One of the rumours dates back a few years ago when there was
one (or more) of the five state-owned commercial banks verging on
liquidity problems because of the irregularities of the internal
staff. In order to back up that problem bank, the several major
banks (usually not the Bank of Korea, as it would be too
conspicuous) will pump in money into that bank. There are numerous
ways to credit the "problem" bank's account. The usual procedure
is to admit a certain amount of deposit from the "problem" bank.
By offering an astronomically high interest rate (according to the
interviewee, it could be as high as 5000% p.a.), the bank will
yield an "excellent" interest revenue which is able to cover the
bad debt.
"Banking System Evolving Into Universal Scale," The Korea
1.
Times, October 22, 1986.
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On the other hand, the banks which rescue the "problem"
banks will transfer the high interest "expenses" to other
"no-problem" state-owned banks. In this regard, the loss will be
shared by the pool of banks, instead of liquidating the bank which
would certainly weaken the confidence of foreign lenders and
investors.
As banks are not required to show a detailed book listing
every item of revenue or expense, the "extra-ordinary" revenues or
expenses will be easily concealed by blending in any income or
expense item in the consolidated account.
By the above example, which of course may not be true, we
could understand the government's concern over maintaining a good
credit rating of the major channel of foreign funds-- the banks.
In fact, foreign banks are more willing to engage in loan
syndications to the central bank, the five commercial banks and the
specialized banks as they are highly secured by the government's
"underground" support.
Similarly to the eight major GTCs (general trading
companies), the Korean government would certainly not allow any of
these national "prime-prime" groups to go into problems. This has
been taken as an axiom by the Koreans as well as the foreign
investors.
From our viewpoint, such auspices on big Korean companies
(both for banks and GTCs) means two advantages to the foreign
banks:
Foreign banks need not worry about the debt repaying
1.
abilities of these borrowers.
As domestic banks are under tight control by the
2
government, we wonder whether the banks have great
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incentives to making profit, and whether they have the
ability to compete with foreign banks and other
financial institutions, especially when the government
liberalizes the banking system.
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CHAPTER VII
FUTURE DIRECTION OF FOREIGN BANKS
General Banking Environment
In order to fit themselves into the changing banking
environment in the ROK, many foreign banks have begun to
restructure their respective business operations either through a
change of business focus, a reduction of personnel or a trimming of
redundant business expansion. Morgan Guaranty's downgrading of its
branch to a representative office status and Wells Fargo Bank's
gearing toward trade financing underscore such reorientation.
On the other hand, there are still a number of comers
joining the league to invest in the nation. For instance, the Bank
of California N.A. has upgraded its Seoul Representative Office to
a branch in November 1986, which may suggest that foreign banks
still have confidence in the Korean banking business. Therefore,
it is inappropriate to make any premature conclusion that the
banking business is no longer attractive to foreign banks. In
fact, this depends very much on the investors' expectation in terms
of profitability level and other concerns.
Nevertheless, given the possible downturn in banking
business for 1987, foreign banks should start to identify their own
strong points in operation so as to carve out a better niche in the
Korean banking market. Apart from staying on with the traditional
lending business, foreign banks should diversify, as some are doing
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now, to other non-lending activities. The previous chapter serves
to outline the positive and negative aspects of banking operations
in the ROK. In the following paragraphs, we will try to identify
several areas that have potential for further growth in the coming
years.
Strategic Diversification
In the ensuing paragraphs, we are going to identify a few
areas of banking business that we consider to be a feasible future
direction of the foreign banks in the ROK in addition to those
businesses that they are now engaged in.
Trust Business
Throughout the past decade, the trust industry in the ROK
has maintained a strong and continuing growth, a result of the
rapid rise of per capita real income, the relatively higher yields
compared to other financial instruments as well as the sharp rise
in the number of banks providing trust services. Total net assets
of investment trusts at the end of 1985 stood at 6,350.6 billion
Won, up 33.3% from the end of 1984. The number of beneficiaries
also rose to 1,133,000 in 1985 from 350,000 in 1980.1 The
permission to engage in the trust business in 1985 gives foreign
banks an opportunity to diversify their business portfolios.
Despite their late entrance to the market, foreign banks can
probably find a niche in the market as they can bring in experts




from their head offices and they are familiar with the worldwide
development which enables them to bring in new instruments to meet
clients' diverse needs. Indeed, the Seoul branch of the U.S.
Bankers Trust Company is now oriented towards the merchant and
trust banking business.
Investment Advisory Services
The healthy development of the Korean economy has generated
foreigners' interest in investing in the country. Table 15
illustrates that foreign investment has increased nearly 2.8 times
from 1980 to 1985. Surely, the more popular the foreign investment
is in the ROK, the greater will be the foreign companies' demand
for assorted financial services. Advisory service will be one of
them. Being a fee-based activity, the Return on Assets Ratio (ROA)
is greatly boosted, which is especially attractive to the American
banks. In addition, such services will generate a relatively
steady income for foreign banks in time of economic downturn.
Leasing
The gathering pace of Korean economic growth during the
early 1970s brought about a sharp rise in capital investments.
Owing to the relative underdevelopment of the domestic capital
market, the demand for such investment always exceeds the supply of
finance from traditional financial institutions. Simultaneously,
the borrowing capacity of companies is being limited by the
increasingly large dependence on external borrowings. Leasing,
rin the advantages like off-balance sheet effects, lower
bea g
collateral requirements and convenience, is therefore growing at an
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average annual rate of over 75% since 1973, with total leasing
contracts valued at 600 billion Won in 1984, compared to only 1
billion Won in 1973. Given that the contribution of leasing in
total capital investment is around 5% to 6% and that leasing can
contribute as much as a fifth of total capital investment in the
advanced economies 1 the leasing business is promising in the
near future.
Korean leasing companies have been heavily dependent upon
borrowings and lease rentals. In 1984, loans from domestic and
foreign financiers accounted for 55.8% of funds raised, and lease
rentals comprised 28.7% of total funds. The composition of the
loans has been mainly foreign currency-denominated, accounting for
almost 65% of the specialized lessors' total funds by the end of
1984, compared to 52% for the merchant banks. Such emphasis on
foreign currency borrowing provides business opportunities for
foreign banks as they are still the main supplier of foreign
currency. Indeed, foreign banks should prepare to become more
involved in the market by establishing leasing companies under
their own management or cooperating with existing leasing
companies.
Money Market Activities
There has been a global trend in the shift of banking
activities towards arbitraging and speculating on currencies,
bonds, debentures, warrants and CDs (Certificates of Deposit). In




our questionnaire survey, we observe that most of the responding
banks predict that money market activities will become more
important in the coming years. Despite the authority may not, by
one reason or another, want to see a boom in such a less
constructive banking business towards the nation's economic growth,
it seems unavoidable that money market activities will become more
vigorous amongst the banking institutions in the next few years.
Securities
Over the past years, the Korean stock market has been very
active, with the average daily turnover of the exchange in the
first eight months of 1986 totaled 36.5 billion Won, up 269% from a
year earlier.1 Considering the economy's prospects for strong
growth, the market will continue to rise in the coming years. The
recent decision by the U.S. Bankers Trust Company to enter the
domestic stock market symbolizes the effort of foreign banks to
diversify their business and to capture the business opportunity.
Hence, foreign banks with their capabilities and experience in the
capital market should branch out their activities to these areas by
engaging in buying and selling of Korean stocks or establishing
themselves as intermediaries in the securitization of bank lending.
Given the burden of substantial debt and the possibility of
economic cyclical downturn, the need for borrowing still exists.
Indeed, the Government's temporary ban on overseas borrowing does
not reflect the actual demand of loans- the private sectors's
"Korean Bourse Is Considered A Hot Frontier", The Asian Wall
1, Street Journal, October 11, 1986.
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demand for loans is still high (as said by Mr. Wong, Royal Bank of
Canada, in our telephone interview). Hence, foreign banks should
not belittle the importance of traditional lending activities where
the profit margin is still attractive.
In short, many foreign banks have been comfortable with the
past banking environment where a certain set of institutional
devices have guaranteed them a targeted return on investment. Yet
the changing banking environment, especially the mounting
competition, begins to compel foreign banks to diversify their
business activities in the ROK. But which areas to go into? The
answer should lie in the relative strength of the individual bank
and its own business philosophy.
Outlook
Indeed, the Korean government is cautiously and gradually
opening the country to foreign investment. In 1986, for the first
time, some of the nation's conglomerates were allowed to issue
convertible securities to foreigners through the London financial
market the response was encouraging and some securities are
currently quoted at between 150 and 250 percent of their face
value.1 The country also plans to allow direct portfolio
investment by foreigners in the Seoul Stock Exchange. These events
show that the government has begun to reduce its tight control over
the nation's major economic activities. Yet official comments on
the liberalization of the Korean market are still ambivalent to




foreigners. For instance, Kim Young Lyong, Deputy Director of
Korea's Foreign Investment Promotion, says there aren't any
imminent changes in the system, and it is not planned to have any
great changes in the foreseeable future. While on the other hand,
Finance Ministry officials say further moves towards liberalization
are expected in 1987, though there isn't any timetable for the
whole precess.1
As we mentioned at the very beginning, it is difficult to
tell whether further liberalization in the financial industry will
be favourable or unfavourable to foreign banks. According to our
questionnaire survey, we find that the responding foreign banks are
not optimistic towards the ROK banking environment at 1990, despite
the fact that they hold an optimistic view of the present
situation. Together with a lot of unfavourable elements (as we
mentioned earlier in Chapter VI), we have to show some reservation
here with respect to the foreign banks' operations in the nation.
It is obvious that the demand for foreign funds will be
decreasing, and there will not be many more loans with very
attractive terms (i.e. good spreads, high fees and availability of
guarantees) in the immediate future. The temporary ban on further
foreign funding has skimmed a lot of the syndication opportunities
-- as the banks are complaining. A few years ago, the major
borrowers (usually the government banks and other non-commercial
banks) sought funds directly from abroad or from the Korean central
bank, the Bank of Korea. Through either way, foreign borrowings
became the chief source of money. As a new trend to foreign




funding, the government now encourages the borrowers to access
through issuance of domestic industrial debentures or bonds.1
Indeed, we would say that the glorious days for foreign
banks' high profiteering in the ROK have passed away.
Nevertheless, as compared with other nations in the Asian-Pacific
region, the ROK still looks attractive to foreign banks though
profit margins will definitely be thinner in the years ahead.
Given the ROK's high foreign debt level, it will be hard for the
country to turn into a creditor from a debtor status in the next
decade.2 As long as the ROK remains a debtor status, the foreign
banks are still wanted to satisfy the country's funding needs. In
addition, a presence in the ROK will be a strategic point in a
bank's global network as the ROK, together with Taiwan, is being
regarded as a fast-growing area in the Asian-Pacific Region. To
repeat, to be successful in the Korean market, it is important for
the existing players (and the new comers, if any) first to assess
their own strengths and weaknesses, and then to identify a
particular market niche to penetrate. It is hoped that our
previous discussion on foreign banks' future directions may throw
some light to foreign bankers in formulating their niche strategy
in the ROK.
"Korea Development May Seek Foreign Funds", The Asian Wall
1. Street Journal, March 6, 1987.
Interview with Mr. William Cruger, Assistant Vice-President,
2. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, H.K.
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Appendix 1
Semi-structured Questionnaire for Interviews
1. Operations in the Republic of Korea (ROK)
History
Reasons to go to ROK
Types of activities engaged
Size of operations (e.g. number of staff)
Your perceived advantages over other competitors in the
ROK operations
2. Recent developments in the ROK banking system
Government policies (e.g. the financial reform since
1980s)
Financial institutions
3. Opportunities/Threats for foreign banks operating in the ROK
Opportunities:
How the bank assesses the opportunities
• Areas of opportunities
• How the bank makes use of the opportunities
Threats:
Areas of threats
How the bank manages to overcome the threats




FOREIGN BANKS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The following questions are strictly for academic purposes only. Your kind
assistance will help us in achieving a good result. In the following
questions, ROK stands for the Republic of Korea. Please feel free to skip
those questions that you think you are not able to answer.
Part I
1. Basic Information
a. Name of bank
b. Year started operation in ROK: 19
in what form: Branch
Location of the regional headquarters for ROKc.
Year obtained bank licence in ROK: 19d.
e. No. of employees in ROK at present:
What were the major reasons that drove your bank to set up the bankingf.
operations in ROK?
2. Activities
Tease rank the following activities of your ROK branch in terms of
importance (use 1 to indicate the most important and 5 to indicate the
least important):
Trade Finance, mainly for which countries?
Retail banking
Corporate finance for domestic clients
Corporate finance for parent country clients doing business in ROK




Other non-financing related activities such as consulting
Others, please specify
The following statements are descriptions concerning the banking
Part II
environment in ROK. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree
with these by putting a tick in the appropriate box.
1 2 3 4 5Internationalization of Financial Market
ROK Government provides mucT incentives to foreign1.
investment
The financial system in ROK is changing towards a2.
more efficient system
ROK Government will be more active in promoting3.
banking business
1 2 3 4 5Government Control on Foreign Banks
Banking restrictions such is the impositions of swaps4.
ceiling lower the profitability of foreign banks
The present restrictions on capital movement,5.
repatriation of earning and interest are acceptable
The set up of trust fund weakens the dominance of6.
foreign banks as suppliers of foreign currencies
Permission to use central bank's rediscount7.
facilities for export financing provides a good













Operations 1 2 3 4 5
8. Cost of running a branch in ROK is high
9. Foreign banks have little difficulty in securing
qualified personnel
10 Demand for credit is still great in ROK
11 ROK borrowers are historically of good creditability
12 Competition from local banks is keen
13 Competition among foreign banks is keen
14 It is difficult for a foreign bank to secure Won
funds in the domestic financial market
Part III
1-Tn general, how do you feel about the banking environment in ROK at the









b. If foreign banks enjoy reasonable to high profitability, the reasons
are:









4. wniild you sav that your operations in ROK (please tick one)
are largely in place
still have significant potential for expansion
are undergoing contraction
Please name three most critical difficulties that you expect your ROK







BANKING BUSINESS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The following questions are strictly for academic purposes only. Your kind
assistance will help us in achieving a good research. In the following
questions, ROK stands for the Republic of Korea. Please feel free to skip
those questions that you think you are not able to answer.
1. Please list the important reason(s) why your bank has not yet set up
branches/representative offices in ROK.
2. As ROK has been improving her foreign debts, would you agree that the
nation will be a lender instead of a debtor country in 1990?
mostneutralmost
unlikelylikely
Has your bank had ever participated in any loan or banking business with3
banks or other clients in ROK before?
Yes
No (end of questionnnaire)
4. In which kind(s) of banking activities?
Trade finance, mainly for which countries?
Retail Banking
Corporate finance for domestic clients
Corporate finance for parent country clients doing business in ROK
Money market/foreign exchange dealing
Bonds dealings
Loan syndications
Non-financing related activities such as consulting
Underwritings, swaps
Others, please specify
5. Would you say those business are of reasonably good profitability? Why or
why not?
6. Please name three most prosperous areas of banking business that you expect




7. Please name three most critical difficulties that you expect for a foreign







FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The Bank of Korea
Central Bank
Nationwide Commercial Banks(7)
Local hanks(10)Commercial Banks Foreign Banks Branches(52)
Korea Exchange Bank
Small and Medium Industry BankBanking Institutions
Citizens National Bank(Deposit Money Banks)
Korea Housing Bank
National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation
Suecialized Banks National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives
and Member Cooperatives
National Livestock Cooperatives Federal
Korea Development Bank
Export-Import Bank of Korea
Development institutions Korea Long Term Cerdit Bank
Trust Accounts of Banking Institutions(18)
Mutual Savings and Finance Comparnies(240)
Credit Unions(5,512)Savings Institutions Mutual Credit(1,627)
Postal Savings of Post Offices
Non-Bank Financial Investment and Financ Companies(32)Investment CompaniesInstitutions Merchant BAnking Corporations(6)





Korea Securities Financce Corporation
Securities Investment Trust Companies(3) Appendix
4
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Questionnaire Set 1 -- sent to Existing Foreign Banks in ROF
1. Basic Information
a. Questionnaires sent out: 58 sets
Number of answered response: 18 sets (15 branches/3 rep. offices)
1 setNumber of unanswered return:
Response rate: 31.6%
b. Responsive banks: 5 American Banks, 4 Japanese Banks, 6 European
Banks and 3 Others.
Most of the responsive banks have their Regional Headquarters in
their headoffices only two have their Regional Headquarters in Hong
Kong and two in Tokyo.
c. Years of Operation in ROK: 3-19 years (average 7.9 years)
d. Most of the responsive banks opened their branches when they
obtained their branch licences; three of the banks have upgraded
their rep. offices to a branches a few years ago when they were
granted the branch licences.
e. No. of employees in ROK offices: 3-170 staff (average 38)
f. Major reasons to set up the banking operations in ROK:
i. High profitability and low risks (esp. in international trade
activities).
ii. International banking business (expansion into South East Asia).
iii. ROK is an opening market with lots of business opportunities.
2. Banking Activities
Ranking of banking activities in terms of importance (1 as the most
important and 5 as the least important):
1 Trade Finance, mainly for which countries? U.S.A., European
countries, Japan, Canada.
1 Corporate finance for domestic clients
2 Loan syndications
3 Money market/foreign exchange dealings
3 Corporate finance for parent country clients doing business in ROK
3/4 Underwritings, swaps, etc.
4 Bonds dealings
5 Retail banking
5 Other non-financing related activities such as consulting
APPENDIX 5
80
3. Banking Environment in ROK
Internationalization of Financial Market
1 2 43 5
ROK Government provides much incentives toa.
foreign investment
b. The financial system in ROK is changing towards a
more efficient system
c. ROK Government will be more active in promoting
banking business
Government Control on Foreign Banks
4 52 31
Banking restrictions such as the impositions ofd.
swaps ceiling lower foreign banks' profitability
e. The present restrictions on capital movement,
repatriation of earning and interest are acceptable
The set up of trust funds weakens the dominance off.
foreign banks as suppliers of foreign currencies
Permission to use central bank's rediscount9
facilities for export financing provides a good
source for local currency
Operations
5431 2
Cost of running a branch in ROK is highh.
Foreign banks have little difficulty in securingi.
qualified personnel
Demand for credit is still great in ROKj.
ROK borrowers are historically of goodk.
creditability
Competition from local banks is keen1.
Competition among foreign banks is keen
m.
It is difficult for a foreign bank to secure Won
n.
funds in the domestic financial market
Responsive banks' feelings on the banking environment in ROK at the
4.















S. Responsive banks' feeling on the profitability of foreign banks in




1. High margin (eg. swaps, loans)
2. High demand for credits (for both Won and foreign currency loans)
3. Low loan loss (bad debt is not serious)
4. Government support esp. to foreign banks.
S. Good investment atmosphere in the country.










7. Outlook of the banks' operations in ROK:
are largely in place10
still have significant potential for expansion4
are undergoing contraction4
The critical difficulties that are expected by the responsive banks:
8.
a. Government control on financial sector (e.g. swap ceilings, lending
ratio, compulsory lending to small and medium size firms), which is
especially disadvantageous towards foreign banks.
b. Political instability. Banks are exposed to risk due to changes in
political structure.
c. Difficulty of access to Won currency, which weakens their
competitive edges over local banks towards the domestic banking
business.
d. Diminishing demand in foreign funds.
e. Government restrictions on foreign loans in order to improve the
country's balance of payment.
f. Competitions amongst foreign banks themselves, and with local banks
and other financial institutions.
g. Less secured loan nowadays, increasing risk exposures towards bad
debts.h. Refinancing of old loans with high interest rate by new agreements
with low interest one.
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Questionnaire Set 2-- sent to Foreign Banks without a presence in ROK
1. Basic Information:
Questionnaires sent out: 50 sets
Number of answered response: 18 sets
2 setsNumber of unanswered return:
Response rate: 37.5%
2. Major reasons of not setting up a banking presence in ROK:
a. There is already a lot of ROK business opportunities (such as loan
syndications) available to banks despite that they do not have a
physical presence in the country.
b. Political instability of the country.
c. Lacking the experience of setting up a branch in ROK.
d. Not justify from the profitability point of view.
e. Prospect of banking business by foreign banks is not as good in th,
country.




Have or have no prior participation in loan or banking business with4.
banks or other clients in ROK:
16Yes
0No
Ranking of banking activities in terms of importance (1 as the most
important and 5 as the least important):
Loan syndications1
Trade finance, mainly for which countries? U.S.A., Asian
2
Countries, Middle East Countries
Corporate finance for domestic clients3
Underwritings, swaps3
Money market/foreign exchange dealing3




Non-financing related activities such as consulting
5
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5. Concerning the profitability of the abovementioned business, all
responsive banks agreed that the profitability are reasonably good to
very good. The reasons for these are:
a. Good loan spreads and fees in general.
b. Low risk, usually very secured.






. The critical difficulties that are expected by the responsive banks:
a. Political instability especially uncertain about the political
atmosphere by 1988.
b. Excessive foreign debt burden so it is dubious whether the country
has adequate repaying ability.
c. Volatile trade pattern so it is uncertain whether ROK can maintain a
high growth in export.
d. Government restrictions on foreign banks' activities in the nation.
e. Lack of Won funds for foreign banks.
f. Lack of qualified personnel in banking.
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Appendix 6
NI.IERICAL RISK RATING MODEL
Graded from 1 (Best) to 10 (Worst)
TotalSocio-Political Prognosis
Grade Weight ScoreStability of Government and its Institutions
4141 Length of term of present of state
11142 Suspected health condition of present head of state
18363 Degree to which successor has been groomed
18364 Degree to which succession procedure has been
decided upon
21375 Threat posed by opposition parties
10256 Threat posed by extra-parliarmentary forces
12267 Degree to which ruling party is united
16448 Degree to which military backs government
10259 Degree to which military is united
81810 Degree to which previous government changes have
been orderly
124311 Apparent hold of current leader on government
162812 Possibility of disruptive transfer of power within
next 5 years
61113 Has Cabinet changed since last survey
(1=unlikely, 5=smooth change, 10=major change)
2 5514 Possibility of major cabinet change within next quarter
(1=unlikely, 5=possible, 10=very likely)
82415 Opinion of these Analysis of Government stability
Source: Outlook for October 1986 through March 1987, Quarterlyu Country Risk
Survey on the Republic of Korea, Issue No. 9, Risk Constancy Ltd.
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(i) A Decade of Growth (ii) Asia's Economic Growth
Real GDPGDP Avg Annual GDP
Growth(in USSbn) Growth (in USSbn)
1986 1987198519851986 1976-861976
4.5% 2.0% 3.0%1,332Japan4.1%559 1,805Japan







Thailand 0.8% 5.1% 5.4%34.1Hong Kong6.0%42.216.5
-3.8% -0.1% 2.7%Philippines 32.76.2%29.411.1Malaysia




(b) Based on 1978-1986's figures
CHART 1






















83.17.9($Bil. in Current Prices)
52,57317,284(Bil. Won in 1980 Prices)
(Secoral GNP










I ($Mil. in Current Prices)
31,1361,984Commodity Imports
I ($Mil. in Current Prices)













The profitability rate is based on the after-tax to net worth
1
ratio.
There is difference in the period of financial year among all
2
institutions.
Source: Bank of Korea, Korea Development Institution.3
Quoted from Securities Investment Trust Cos. Emerge as Most
4.
Profitable in '85, The-Korea-Times, July 2, 1986.
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Table 3
Foreign banks in ROK as at 1986



























4,056.52,221.4 2,886.4 3,389.2895.7 1,929.7Foreign Currency (79.8)(80.5)(82.3)(77.2)(79.8)(76.9)
3,005.6 3,650.02,113.7 2,530.2876.7 1,875.2Inter-Office Borrowings (71.8)(71.4)(72.2)(73.4)(77.6)(75.3)
272.8227.3319.792.943.915.0Deposits in Foreign Curren
(5.4)(5.4)(9.1)(3.3)(1.8)(1.3)
133.756.336.514.80.64.0Others (2.6)(3.7)(1.0)(0.5)(0.4)(0.3)
4,209.5 5,083.72,879.3 3,506.61,164.9 2,416.9Total (100.0) (100.0)(100.0) (100.0)(100.0) (100.0)
The figures in parenthesis represent relative weights
Note:




Foreign Bank's Uses of Funds
(In Billion Won)
198419831982198119801979
2,093.3 2,436.5999.6 1,253.6 1,655.4421.2Local Currency
(47.9)(49.8)(46.9)(43.5)(41.4)(36.2)
1,709.2846.7 1,095.2 1,341.0615.5294.9Loans Discounts
(33.6)(31.8)(31.2)(29.4)(25.5)(25.3)






2,111.2 2,647.21,625.7 1,859.1743.7 1,417.3Foreign Currency (52.1)(50.2)(53.1)(26.5)(58.6)(63.8)
1,657.5 1,933.41,389.0 1,616.9674.6 1,202.3Loans in Foreign Currency (38.1)(39.4)(46.1)(48.3)(49.7)(57.9)
51.252.440.543.219.16.8Due from Banks in Foreign (1.0)(1.3)(1.2)(1.5)(0.8)(0.6)Currency 178.3193.8101.761.160.530.4Foreign Exchange (3.5)(4.6)(2.9)(2.1)(2.5)(2.6) 484.3207.5100.0132.3135.431.9Others (9.5)(4.9)(2.9)(4.6)(5.6)(2.7)
4,209.5 5,083.72,879.3 3,506.61,164.9 2,416.9Total (100.0) (100.0)(100.0) (100.0)(100.0) (100.0)
The figures in parenthesis represent relative weights




Foreign Bank's Deposits Loans(%)
1982 1983 19841978 1979 1980 1981197719761975
DEPOSITS
1.04 1.29 1.381.2 0.93 1.24 1.211.11.11.1Local Currency
41.80 30.51 31.032.0 1.43 2.72 10.195.16.0 11.3Foreign Currency
LOANS
6.645.74 5.85 6.044.4 3.57 5.454.i3.53.0Local Currency
48.96 51.85 74.3039.15 46.31 50.0517.4 39.9 38.4Foreign Currency 15.4
8.558.42 8.32 8.52SAHRES IN 'TOTAL 5.7 6.15 9.185.44.24.1
ASSETS
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin.
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Table 7
Profitability Differential Between Foreign Banks
Korean Deposit Money Banks
(All Figures in%)
ProfitabilityProfitability








1.981.44-0.20 1.580.340.201.781982 2.171.67-0.15 1.920.350.102.021983 2.842.322.650.080.600.272.921984
The Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin.Source: Profitability Differential= Profitability of Foreign Banks minus
Note:
Profitability of Other Deposit Money Banks.
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Table 8
Business Performance of Top 20
Foreign Banks in 1982-1985

















1,8252,1761,9292,251BNP16 1,7611,267743557Marine Midland17 1,70295728333Chemical18 1,5351,8011,4951,109Crocker National19 1,4161,6821,236847Indosuez20
Source: Newsreview, April 19, 1986.
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Won to US DollarExchange Rates of





























Source: Monthly Bulletin July 1986, The Bank of Korea
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Table 11












































Data refer to 1979
Models of Development, A Comparative Study of Economic
Source:
Growth in South Korea and Taiwan





8,456 27,315 40,448 43,124 46,7022,245Outstanding Debt
n/a5,745 17,185 26,423 29,6831,702a. Maturity of 3 years or more
n/a2,1061,910754370170b. Maturity of 1 to 3 years




33,541 33,0505,884 22,577 30,3481,279Foreign Exchange Earnings (2)
18.616.515.713.112.018.2Service Ratio (1/2)%





Aug. Jan-AugAug. Jan-AugAug. Jan-AugItem
2,724543(977)1,747 (11)532Current account
2,033425(376)(16)409 1 ,657Trade balance
3,9406792,146 16,9302,825 20,870Exports
254 1 ,9072,162 17,3062,416 19,213Imports
42661(956)(44)17 (530)Invisible trade balance
7441304,3425285,086658Receipts 318695,2985725,616641Payments
2655735549620106Unrequited transfer (net)
(473)39 5 (77)13558 (78)Net long-term capital
2,231466124 (582)1, 669590Basic balance
311271(498)(259)12 (187)Net short-term capital (234)(365)227 (493)(727)(138)Errors omissions
2,32837292 (1,573)755464Overall balance
Source: Newsreview, Sept. 27, 1986.
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Table 15
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